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envisaged on the legislative level and became a fundamental principle of the Soviet 
criminal law: crimes against the state were made the gravest ones, and the punishment 
for these crimes was much heavier than for all other crimes. The principle of analogy 
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of Criminal Law
when Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, one of their main goals was to repeal 
the legislation of the russian Empire and to replace it with new soviet legislation. At 
the same time, they understood that it was impossible to create a new legal system 
from scratch. one of the first acts of the Bolsheviks authorized courts to use “the laws 
of the overthrown governments” (that is, pieces of the pre-revolutionary legislation) 
that “were not repealed by the revolution and did not contradict the revolutionary 
conscience and the revolutionary legal consciousness.”1
Marxist-Leninist doctrine viewed law as a tool intended to maintain the 
domination of the working classes over the non-working classes. According to Marx 
and Lenin, law was essential for a bourgeois society, where it was a tool of capitalist 
domination and a reflection of the bourgeois values. In a classless communist 
society law would not be needed and would inevitably wither away together with 
state, family and other “anachronisms of bourgeois society.” however, at the time 
of transition from dictatorship of proletariat to socialism and then to communism, 
law was certainly needed as a temporary phenomenon. thus, despite a temporary 
acceptance of law as a tool of the revolution, it is not surprising that this Marxist 
attitude towards law later on translated into disrespect for law and legal nihilism. 
when the new soviet Codes were developed during the early 1920s, in most 
cases the drafters drew on the imperial codes. Criminal law was an exception. In the 
early soviet criminal legislation the juridical categories of crime, punishment, and guilt 
were replaced by sociological categories. the phrases “socially dangerous act” and 
“measure of social defense” were substituted for the words “crime” and “punishment”: 
“the criminal legislation of the rsFsr has as its aim the protection of the socialist 
state of workers and Peasants, and the legal order established therein, from socially 
dangerous acts (crimes) by means of application to persons who committed them of 
the measures of social defense indicated in the present Code.”2 Fault was declared to 
1  Декрет о суде № 1 от 22 ноября (5 декабря) 1917 г. [decree on Courts Nо. 1 of November 22, 1917] 
(Feb. 20, 2017), available at http://www.hist.msu.ru/Er/Etext/dEkrEt/o_sude1.htm.
2  Уголовный кодекс РСФСР 1926 г. [Criminal Code of the rsFsr of 1926], Art. 1 (Feb. 20, 2017), available 
at http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=Esu;n=3274#0.
EKATERINA MISHINA 59
be a bourgeois criterion: “measures of social defense” should be applied in accordance 
with the best interests of the “workers’-and-Peasants’ state,” as determined by the 
“revolutionary legal consciousness” of the judges.3 Art. 23 of the 1922 Criminal Code 
of the rsFsr introduced the principle of retroactivity of the soviet criminal law. the 
same principle was envisaged in Art. 6 of the 1929 decree of the Presidium of the 
ussr Central Executive Committee of November 21, 1929, “on Criminalization of 
soviet officials who Joined the Enemies of the working Class and the Peasantry 
Abroad and refused to return to the ussr.” such refusal of a soviet official to 
return to the soviet union was qualified as high treason and was punishable by 
confiscation of all the offender’s property and execution by shooting within 24 hours 
from the moment of establishment of identity. By virtue of the aforementioned 
Art. 6, provisions of this decree applied also to those soviet officials who refused 
to return to the ussr before the day of enactment of the decree. the doctrine of 
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (which now is stipulated at the international level 
in Art. 7 of the European Convention for human rights) became the object of sharp 
criticism, and instead the principle of analogy was introduced: if an act or omission 
was considered socially dangerous – even though no specific statute prohibited it – 
the judge could apply a statute prohibiting an analogous act or omission.4 that is 
how the supremacy of law was replaced by “revolutionary legal conscience.” 
the 1922 Criminal Code envisaged two main types of crimes: “Crimes directed 
against the fundamentals of the new legal order established by the power of workers 
and peasants or recognized as the most dangerous by the soviet regime” and “all 
other crimes.”5 through this conceptual division of criminality, the key Marxist-
Leninist principle of supremacy of interests of the state over the interests of an 
individual was envisaged on the legislative level and became a fundamental principle 
of the soviet criminal law. traditionally, various crimes are specified in the special 
part of a Criminal Code according to the degree of social danger: the gravest crimes 
always go first. In the 1922 Criminal Code, crimes against life, freedom and dignity 
of individuals were put into Chapter v – after the crimes against the state, official 
malfeasance, breach of rules of separation of church from the state and economic 
crimes. the legislative intent was to show that crimes against individuals were less 
dangerous that the other four types of wrongdoings above. From the viewpoint of 
the soviet lawmakers, murder and rape were less dangerous than wasteful usage 
of labor force provided in the form of exercise of compulsory labor duty (Art. 127) 
or moonlighting (Art. 140). It is also remarkable that libel and criminal insult were 
criminalized as early as in 1922. 
3  harold J. Berman, Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 56 yale Law Journal 803 (1947).
4  Уголовный кодекс РСФСР 1922 г. [Criminal Code of the rsFsr of 1922], Art. 10 (Feb. 20, 2017), available 
at http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=Esu;n=3006;frame=83#0.
5  Id. Art. 27.
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the 1926 Criminal Code of the rsFsr made social danger itself, and not violation 
of a specific provision of the special part of the Code, the key to judicial sanctioning.6 
the new Code incorporated the basic provisions of the 1922 Criminal Code and 
brought them to a more advanced level. under the 1922 Code, a person could be 
recognized as socially dangerous (1) as a result of his/her criminal activity, “due to 
systematic abuses in his/her professional activity,” or due to his/her connections 
with the criminal environment.7 the 1926 Code added one more ground – previous 
activities of the person in question.8 In some cases, punishment was based on 
the perceived social danger of the person rather than on the act that this person 
committed. Art. 7 of the 1926 Code stated: “with regard to persons who have 
committed socially dangerous acts or who represent a danger because of their 
connection with a criminal environment or because of their past activity, measures 
of social defense of a judicial-correctional, medical or medico-educational character 
shall be applied.” thus a person who committed no act whatsoever but merely had 
a “connection with criminal environment,” or who had engaged in “past activity 
which caused him to pose a danger,” could be sentenced by a court.9 the term 
“punishment” that was used together with the term “measures of social defense” in 
the 1922 Code was not included in the 1926 Code: “Measures of social defense of 
a judicial-correctional nature” was the new Code’s euphemism for criminal sanctions 
imposed by a court.10 the new Code held that the principle of analogy remained 
one of the key principles of the soviet criminal law: “If any socially dangerous act is 
not directly provided by the present Code, the basis and limits of responsibility for 
it shall be determined by application of those articles of the Code which provide for 
crimes most similar to it in nature.”11 Consequently, any person could be determined 
socially dangerous for practically any reason. this created a convenient design for 
a totalitarian state: at any time, any person could be imprisoned or shot, in full 
accordance with the law.
the priority to protect the new regime was made even more clear in comparison 
to the previous Code. “Any act or omission directed against the soviet system or that 
violates the legal order established by the worker-peasant power during the period 
of transition to the communist system” constituted a socially dangerous act (Art. 6). 
the gravest crimes were those directed against the socialist state. this led to a very 
6  harold J. Berman, Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes 21 (Cambridge, Mass.: harvard 
university Press, 1972).
7  Criminal Code of the rsFsr of 1922, supra note 4, Arts. 48, 49.
8  Criminal Code of the rsFsr of 1926, supra note 2, Art. 7. 
9  Berman 1972, at 21.
10  Id.
11  Criminal Code of the rsFsr of 1926, supra note 2, Art. 16. 
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sharp division between political and non-political crimes. Art. 46 of the 1926 Code 
provided that crimes contained in this Code are classified as follows:
•	 Those	directed	against	the	foundations	of	the	Soviet	system	established	
in the ussr by the power of workers and peasants, and therefore considered 
to be the most dangerous;
•	 All	other	crimes.12
Punishments for crimes directed against the foundations of the soviet system 
were much heavier than punishments for other crimes. the death penalty was 
applicable only to crimes against the state.13 
In an insightful commentary on these issues, Professor harold J. Berman 
wrote that some of the philosophy of the early soviet criminal law “seems to 
have stemmed from the sociological school of jurisprudence of the 19th and early 
20th century”, and that “soviet jurists were greatly influenced by Enrico Ferri, the 
leader of the sociological school”14. soviet legal scholars,15 however, angrily rejected 
the assumption that Enrico Ferri’s theories had a significant impact on the formation 
of early soviet criminal law. they considered it shameful to acknowledge that the 
conceptual and categorical apparatus of soviet criminal law was formed under 
a pronounced influence of an odious bourgeois scholar and a Mussolini apologist 
who actively collaborated with the Nazi regime. Nevertheless, the resemblance was 
too close to go unnoticed. It is telling that Ferri’s Criminal Sociology was not reprinted 
in russia for nearly a hundred years.
According to Ferri’s concept of social protection, the function of justice is to 
protect society from socially dangerous elements. Ferri denied such basic elements of 
criminal law as crime, punishment, guilt, responsibility, and the objective examination 
of a crime, and he strongly advocated for the personification of punishment, or the 
determination of punishment based on the personality of the offender, not on the 
offense. A key role in determining punishment was played by the judges. “since 
punishments, instead of being the simple panacea of crime which popular opinion, 
encouraged by the opinions of classical writers on crime and of legislators, imagine 
them, are very limited in their deterrent influence, it is natural that the criminal 
sociologist should look for other means of social defense in the actual study of crimes 
12  Berman 1972, at 22.
13  Id.
14  Berman 1947, at 804.
15  See Пионтковский А. Марксизм и уголовное право. О некоторых спорных вопросах теории 
уголовного права [Andrey Piontkovsky, Marxism and the Criminal Law. On Certain Disputable Issues 
of Criminal Law Theory] (Moscow: Juridical Publishing house of the People’s Commissariat of Justice 
of the ussr, 1927).
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and of their natural origin. we are taught by the everyday experience of the family, 
the school, associations of men and women, and the history of social life, that in 
order to lessen the danger of outbreaks of passion it is more useful to take them in 
their origin, and in flank, than to meet them when they have gathered force… If the 
counteraction of punishment must inevitably be opposed to criminal activity, still 
it is more conducive to social order to prevent or diminish this activity by means of 
an indirect and more effective force.”16 Ferri’s theory contributed greatly to shaping 
the defensive nature of the soviet criminal law. 
the first soviet Criminal codes (1922 and 1926) influenced the initial competence 
and specific mentality of the soviet judges. Certain explicit instructions on the mode 
of judicial behavior also came from the part of the head of the Bolshevik state: 
“the courts should not do away with terror – to promise that would be to deceive 
ourselves and others – but should give it foundation and legality, clearly, honestly, 
without embellishments.”17 specific features of the early soviet criminal law provided 
unlimited possibilities for judicial discretion, arbitrary interpretation and selective 
application of law as follows:
•	 Ambiguity	of	norms	describing	grave	crimes	(counterrevolutionary	crimes	
and crimes directed against the foundations of the soviet state) and the 
presence of the principle of analogy allowed discretion to qualify most of 
acts as socially dangerous ones;
•	 The	provision	that	a	socially	dangerous	person	includes	not	only	a	person	who	
committed a socially dangerous act, but also those who allowed systematic 
abuses in the course of fulfilling their professional duties, as well as those 
who had connections with the criminal environment (Arts. 48, 49 of the 1922 
Criminal Code). the new Criminal Code of 1926 added one more qualifying 
characteristic: a person with a suspicious or otherwise problematic past was 
also considered socially dangerous (Art. 7). 
•	 According	to	the	requirements	of	the	early	Soviet	legislation,	judges	had	to	
handle cases in accordance with the available legislation and revolutionary 
legal consciousness.
•	 It	was	up	 to	a	 judge	 to	decide	which	 type	of	punishment	 (measure	of	
social defense) should be applied in a particular case and how severe such 
punishment should be.
•	 The	most	severe	types	of	punishment	(including	the	death	penalty)	were	
envisaged for counter-revolutionary crimes (Art. 58) and other crimes directed 
16  Ферри Э. Уголовная социология [Enrico Ferri, Criminal Sociology], 100–111 (Moscow: Infra-M, 
2009).
17  Ленин В.И. Дополнения к проекту вводного закона к Уголовному кодексу РСФСР и письмо 
Д.И. Курскому 17 мая 1922 года [vladimir I. Lenin, Additions to the Draft Introductory Act to the Criminal 
Code of the RSFSR and Letter to D.I. Kursky of May 17, 1922] 296 (Moscow: Collected works, vol. 27, 
1932).
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against the foundations of the soviet state. According to the provisions of the 
1926 Criminal Code, such crimes did not have to necessarily involve criminal 
intent.
By the 1930s, it became clear that early revolutionary ideas about the inevitable 
demise of law, state, family and other basic were unrealistic. the soviet criminal law, 
however, proved to be a surprisingly useful tool: the state appreciated it, began to 
enjoy it, and ultimately decided not to reject it any more. the trend towards criminal 
repression intensified with as stalin’s personal grip on power strengthened.18 one of 
the immediate results was the passing of three notorious acts. the Joint decree of the 
ussr Central Executive Committee and sovnarkom of August 7, 1932 “on Protection 
of Property of state-run Enterprises, Collective Farms and Cooperatives, and 
strengthening of Public socialist Property,” or “the Law of three spikelets,” explicitly 
emphasized the persistent defensive nature of the soviet criminal law. the preamble 
of the act stated that the decree was the state’s response to the repeated complaints 
of workers and peasants regarding theft of cargos, kolkhoz and cooperative property 
committed by “antisocial elements.” All types of public property (state, kolkhoz and 
cooperative property) were declared as fundamental to the socialist public order. 
Persons attempting theft of public property were labeled “enemies of the people,” 
and the fight against “enemies of the people” was proclaimed the top priority of 
the soviet state. the Law of three spikelets envisaged execution by shooting and 
confiscation of property as a measure of punishment for (1) a theft of kolkhoz or 
cooperative property and (2) pilferage committed on a railway or water transport. 
If there were mitigating circumstances, the capital punishment could be replaced 
by 10 years’ imprisonment with confiscation of property. Persons sentenced under 
this law were not subject to amnesty.
the Joint decree of the ussr Central Executive Committee and sovnarkom of 
August 22, 1932 “on Fighting Blackmarketeering” served as a logical continuation of 
the Law of three spikelets. this act envisaged disproportionally severe punishments 
for activities that could be qualified as black marketeering (given that the principle of 
analogy was still in force): a person could be sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment 
for selling cookies on the black market, for example. this decree provided additional 
legal grounds for the battle of the soviet state against its own people as they were 
sliding into poverty. Early 1930s saw horrific consequences of collectivization, which 
caused mass starvation and poverty. Another hidden goal of this decree was to 
eliminate memories about the New Economic Policy, which was discontinued in 
1927. By proclaiming the NEP in March 1921, the soviet government formally 
recognized for the first time that its previous economic policies had failed. this 
same proclamation showed – also for the first time – how pliable the communist 
18  Мишина Е. Длинные тени советского прошлого [Ekaterina Mishina, Long Shadows of the Soviet Past] 
37 (Moscow: “Liberalnaya Missiya,” 2014).
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ideology could be: in the face of impending economic disaster, the “die-hard” 
fighters against “capitalist exploiters” and private property decided to turn back to 
certain elements of in order to prevent the country from plunging into economic 
chaos. In a short time, the NEP saved the economy and started to appear politically 
dangerous. the early 1930s marked a new phase in the life of the soviet union, with 
no place for the NEP. this new phase brought a new concept of responsibility for 
the activities in breach of the soviet legislation in force – a collective responsibility. 
An offender’s family members also had to be convicted and made liable for the 
offender’s wrongdoings. 
the resolution of the ussr Central Executive Committee of June 8, 1934 “on 
Amending of Provisions on Crimes against the state (Counterrevolutionary Crimes 
and Crimes against Administrative order) with Articles on Betrayal of the Motherland” 
introduced a particularly broad definition of “betrayal of the Motherland.” Persons 
convicted under this resolution were punished by execution and confiscation of 
property; if there were mitigating circumstances, the punishment was 10 years of 
imprisonment with confiscation of property. Betrayal of the Motherland committed 
by a military serviceman was punishable with death penalty and confiscation of 
property. If a military serviceman knew that a betrayal of Motherland was committed 
or imminent and failed to report it, he was subject to 10 years of imprisonment. If family 
members of a military serviceman who undertook an unauthorized travel outside of 
the soviet union contributed to the act of betrayal of the Motherland or knew about 
it and did not notify the authorities, they were subject to 5–10 years of imprisonment 
with confiscation of property. the Law “on Family Members of traitors of Motherland” 
followed in March of 1935. In the same year, the age of criminal responsibility was 
reduced from 14 to 12 years old. the decree of the ussr Central Executive Committee 
of october 2, 1937, extended the maximum term of imprisonment for the most 
dangerous crimes (sabotage, espionage, etc.) from 10 to 25 years.
the assassination of sergey kirov on december 1, 1934, became a trigger for 
the escalation of political repression. Another decree of the ussr Central Executive 
Committee followed on the very same day. this act introduced amendments to 
the criminal procedural legislation envisaging a special order of adjudication for 
the cases of terrorist organizations and terrorist acts that targeted soviet officials.19 
Investigation of such cases were required to be conducted within 10 days. Criminal 
defendants had to be served with indictments one day before the trial (and in 
most cases, they were not served at all). hearings were conducted in absentia, and 
19  Постановление ЦИК СССР от 1 декабря 1934 г. «О внесении изменений в действующие уголовно-
процессуальные кодексы союзных республик» [decree of the ussr Central Executive Committee of 
december 1, 1934. on Amending Codes of Criminal Procedure of the union republics] (Feb. 20, 2017), 
available at http://www.alppp.ru/law/ugolovnoe-pravo--ispolnenie-nakazanij/16/postanovlenie-cik-
sssr-ot-01-12-1934.html.
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convictions were not subject to appeal. guilty verdicts resulting in a death penalty 
were enforced immediately.20
the special Nkvd order of July 30, 1937 Nо. 00447 “on repression of Former 
kulaks, Criminals and other Anti-soviet Elements” illustrates how the soviet criminal 
justice worked in the late 1930s. this startling document was designed specifically 
for the purposes of the great Purge and envisaged “Contingents (Quotas) subject 
to repression” according to the following categories:
1. Former kulaks, returning after serving out their punishment and continuing 
to conduct active anti-soviet subversive activity.
2. Former kulaks escaping from camps or labor colonies carrying out anti-soviet 
activity.
3. Former kulaks and socially dangerous elements, belonging to rebellious, fascist, 
terrorist, and bandit formations, serving out their terms, hiding from repression or 
escaping from places of confinement and resuming their anti-soviet criminal activity.
4. Members of anti-soviet parties (listed), former whites, gendarmes, officials, 
members of punitive organizations, bandits, and gang members, accomplices, those 
assisting escapes, re-emigrants, those hiding from repression, fleeing from places 
of confinement and continuing to conduct anti-soviet activity.
5. those exposed as a result of investigations as the most hostile and active 
participants in currently-being-liquidated Cossack-white guard insurgent organizations, 
fascist, terrorist, espionage-diversionist counter-revolutionary formations.
6. the most active anti-soviet elements among former kulaks, members of 
punitive bodies, bandits, sectarian activists, church officials and others currently 
being held in prisons, camps, work colonies and continuing to carry out active anti-
soviet insurgency work. Criminals (bandits, thieves, recidivist thieves, professional 
contrabandists, swindler-recidivists, livestock thieves) carrying out criminal activity 
and circulating in criminal milieu.
7. Criminal elements located in camps and work colonies and conducting criminal 
activity.
8. All the above elements currently located in villages – in collective farms, state 
farms, agricultural enterprises and in cities – in industrial and trade enterprises, 
transport, in soviet institutions and in construction are subject to repression.21 
the decree stipulated the following measures of punishment: “the most 
dangerous individuals shall be immediately arrested. After adjudication of their cases 
by special troikas, such individuals are subject to a death penalty. Less dangerous 
individuals shall be arrested and sent to labor camps for 8–10 years. the most socially 
dangerous individuals shall be imprisoned for the same period.”22 
20 decree of the ussr Central Executive Committee of december 1, 1934, supra note 19.
21  Paul r. gregory, Lenin’s Brain and Other Tales from the Secret Soviet Archives 50 (stanford, CA: hoover 
Institution Press Publication, 2007).
22  Id.
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL    Volume V (2017) Issue 1 66
Between August of 1937 and october of 1938 767,397 people were convicted 
under the special Nkvd order of July 30, 1937 Nо. 00447. of those, 386,798 people 
were executed; others were imprisoned or sent to siberian labor camps. 
Beyond violating bedrock principles of criminal responsibility under the law, 
these standards became a terrible weapon and a basis of a catastrophe waiting to 
happen. the elasticity and vagueness of early soviet criminal law provided a pseudo-
legalization for the massacre of hundreds of thousands of innocent people.
the implications of the early soviet approach to criminal law remain relevant and 
dangerous to this day. the early soviet criminal law, including the Criminal Codes of 
1922 and 1926, formed the basis for a legal tradition of arbitrary interpretation and 
selective application of the law. these acts contributed significantly to the formation 
of a specific mentality of soviet judges and transformed judicial discretion into judicial 
arbitrariness. And here, too, Ferri’s theories played a sinister role in establishing that 
the main function of justice is to protect society from socially dangerous elements. In 
the soviet version of this concept, the basic function of justice has transformed into 
the prioritization of defense of the state over defense of its citizens. this approach 
became customary in the soviet union. 
Big changes took place in the soviet criminal legislation in 1960, when the new 
Criminal Code of the rsFsr was adopted. As Professor harold J. Berman puts it, 
“the restoration of the traditional vocabulary of criminal law, the limitation of the 
doctrine of analogy, the careful analysis of crime in terms of subject and object, and 
the emphasis throughout on strict legality all bear witness to what may be called 
a struggle for Law.”23 donald d. Barry, george ginsburgs and Peter B. Maggs state that 
many of the most important developments in soviet law that took place in the 1960s 
and 1970s “could be classified under the heading of legal reform, and this would 
apply in particular to the impressive codification activity that has taken place in many 
branches of law.”24 however, that legal reform retained its soviet underpinnings. 
similar to the 1926 Criminal Code, the interests of the soviet state were the top 
priority: crimes against the state (treason, espionage, sabotage, wrecking, anti-soviet 
agitation and propaganda, etc.) were still considered the most dangerous crimes. 
the 1960 Criminal Code envisaged a number of wrongdoings typical of the soviet 
regime: violation of rules for currency transactions, failure to report crime against 
the state, theft of state or social property, pederasty, defamation, insult, private 
entrepreneurial activity and activity as commercial middleman, profiteering, etc. 
Even vagrancy was criminalized in May of 1961 by the decree of the Presidium of the 
ussr supreme soviet “on tightening of Control over Individuals Avoiding socially 
useful Labor and Engaging in Antisocial Parasitic Lifestyle.”
23  Berman 1947, at 836.
24  See Soviet Law after Stalin (d.d. Barry et al., eds., the Netherlands: sijthoff and Noordhoff Publishers, 
1978).
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Along with other major political changes, the 1990s saw a long-awaited huma-
nization and modernization of russian criminal law. the 1996 russian Criminal Code 
brought a fundamental change of the top priorities of russian criminal law, which 
emphasized on the protection of the individual. Legality, equality before the law, 
liability solely based on guilt, justice and humanism became the basic underlying 
principles of the new Code.25 the fact that these principles are stated signals an intent 
to depart from the principles and practices of the old soviet Code, which emphasized 
“protection of the social structure of the ussr, its political and economic system… 
and socialist law and order.”26
2. Incomplete Reforms: Business, Criminal Law  
and “Artificial Criminalization”
significant achievements were made in modernization and humanization of the 
russian penal law in 1990s in a clear attempt to break with the soviet past; even so, 
the initial version of the Criminal Code of the russian Federation outlined economic 
crimes in a way that continued to reflect socialist attitudes. As a result, entrepreneurs 
and their property were inadequately protected under russian law. Because of the 
government’s weak commitment to protecting private property, doing business 
in russia continued to involve unnecessarily large risks even after the change to 
a market economic system. unfortunately, the situation has only deteriorated 
since the 1990s. the principles of justice and individual equality under the law no 
longer apply in russia today. In addition to abnormal economic conditions in the 
marketplace, businesspeople in russia face additional risks stemming from abuses 
of power by law enforcement agencies and the impossibility of compliance with 
legislation currently in force. As a result, russian businesspeople are not protected 
by the law and do not feel safe. As a result, more and more russian businesspeople 
are opting for relocation to countries where they may benefit from legal systems that 
provide real protections to law-abiding entrepreneurs in the form of dependable 
individual and property rights.
the situation in russia today may be described as an almost total lack of property 
protections that should be guaranteed in criminal law and constant wrangling 
between entrepreneurs and government officials. this model is based on the old-
fashioned idea that it is possible to make economic decisions at the state level, using 
the law as a tool to benefit both the legal and the non-legal interests of government 
officials. the authors of the Conceptual Framework for the Modernization of the 
25  Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации 1996 г. [Criminal Code of the russian Federation of 1996], 
Arts. 3–7 (Feb. 20, 2017), available at http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAw_10699/.
26  Peter B. Maggs et al., Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation 765 (6th ed., huntington, New 
york: Juris Publishing Inc., 2015).
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Criminal Code of the russian Federation in the Economic sphere27 treat this model 
as a modified socialist idea using a body of criminal law as a tool of economic 
management. the concept emphasizes that having the ability to affect the economy 
is predicated on administrative discretion. this perspective, in turn, evokes the 
phenomenon of a “mixed nature” of business. under this construct, a business can be 
characterized as having some legal aspects and some non-legal aspects at the same 
time. In other words, a business can be considered legal from the standpoint of non-
criminal law, but illegal from the standpoint of criminal law. Accordingly, artificial 
criminalization of business activity may be secured either through the adoption 
of repressive, soviet-like criminal legislation, or by means of undue, arbitrary legal 
interpretations that disfigure the nature of the legal norms in question.
As a result of non-legal interpretation, a legal norm can be replaced by a quasi-
norm that qualifies, or reclassifies, as illegal all business activities that are considered 
to be completely legal in other areas of law. where the concept of artificial 
criminalization has the potential to be invoked, any legal contract or transaction 
falls under a real threat that it might be qualified as illegal. An illustrative example 
may be found in the text of the resolution of the supreme Court of the russian 
Federation of december 27, 2007. the act states that a transaction, a contract, or an 
otherwise legitimate activity can be proclaimed criminal if a court finds a motivation 
for committing a crime. such an approach inevitably results in an escalating cascade 
of criminal repressions that target entrepreneurial activities.
when the new Criminal Code of 1996 was drafted and adopted, humanization 
of legal norms was declared to be one of the main goals. Indeed, the revised Code 
eliminated certain notorious articles dating back to the soviet Criminal Code that 
stipulated criminal penalties for homosexuality, vagrancy, currency-exchange 
operations, and so on. At the same time, the humanizing trend of 1990s had almost 
no effect on those provisions of the Code that pertain to economic crimes. Moreover, 
it turned out to be impossible to extract the bad heredity of the soviet Criminal Code 
of 1960. that Criminal Code was infamous for the severity of the sanctions that it 
imposed on people who were convicted of economic crimes. the repressive nature of 
the soviet Criminal Code is still present in a number of provisions of the Criminal Code 
of 1996, especially those related to punishments and law-enforcement procedures 
in the sphere of business. when an excessively repressive criminal legislation is 
combined with a broad interpretation of what is permissible when it comes to the 
targeting of business activities, the end result is the establishment of penalties against 
businesspeople that may be more severe than the penalties established for convicted 
felons. Furthermore, the escalating severity of punishments for economic crimes – 
a salient feature of russian criminal policy both in soviet times and in the period of 
27  See Концепция модернизации уголовного законодательства в экономической сфере [Concept 
of Modernization of Criminal Legislation in the Economic Domain] (Moscow: “Liberalnaya Missiya,” 
2010).
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transition to the market economy – brings serious social and economic damage. this 
is despite the fact that world history shows that increasing the severity of criminal 
penalties has never stabilized or reduced the level of crime, and never will.
the reality is that russian legislative norms regulating the issues of property rights 
and economic activity provide scant protections for individuals or their property. what 
is more, such norms constitute a serious threat to individual rights and freedoms: 
their formulations are ambiguous and uncertain, and there is a serious risk of “ditto-
ology” and arbitrary interpretation. In its present form, russian criminal legislation 
is not only an impediment against, but quite obviously a threat to, russia’s further 
social and economic development. originally instituted values, such as protection of 
property rights and fair competition (in the initial sense of these definitions) are at 
the point of disappearing. Moreover, the possibility that criminal punitive measures 
can be applied under ambiguous legislative acts sets the stage for abuses of power 
by law-enforcement agencies. In the criminal procedure area as well, russian law-
enforcement agencies practice arbitrary interpretations of the norms of the russian 
Code of Criminal Procedure – especially norms relating to economic crime. this 
environment of arbitrary interpretation contributes to the repressive nature of 
criminal procedure in russia. It also blocks the application of legal norms regulating 
special procedures for persons charged with economic crimes. A very recent example 
of dangerously vague interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure can be seen in 
the application of one of the new norms of the russian Code of Criminal Procedure: 
Provision 1.1 of Art. 108 of the Code establishes that detention shall not be applied 
to those charged with the types of crimes indicated in this provision if such a crime 
was committed in the context of entrepreneurial activity.
the main sources of existing problems are arbitrary interpretation of the norms 
of the russian Criminal Code and the russian Code of Criminal Procedure, improper 
law enforcement and deformation of the legal consciousness of the russian people. 
this phenomenon has been captured in numerous sociological surveys. Most 
respondents think that russians are not protected while doing business, and that 
their property is not protected either. In order to do business in russia, one must 
obtain numerous official permissions, known colloquially as “no-objections.” Even 
while purporting to conduct legitimate economic activity, a law-abiding russian 
entrepreneur must solicit these permissions from numerous governmental agencies 
to avoid arbitrary enforcement of vague statutes.
3. The Continuing Influence of the “Best Traditions” of Soviet Criminal Law – 
Contemporary Case Studies
Certain cases as well as recently passed pieces of the russian legislation show 
the sings of old soviet attitudes in contemporary russian criminal law and law 
enforcement.
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The Pussy Riot Case. For organizing a so-called “punk prayer” in Moscow’s Christ 
the savior Cathedral in February 2012, Pussy riot members were arrested and later 
sentenced to two years in prison. their case reveals a number of disturbingly familiar 
features in russia’s public and legal environment. Most people might dislike the idea 
of holding a punk prayer in a place where believers come to worship. however, despite 
individual tastes and attitudes toward the band’s performance, under the law, Pussy 
riot members should not have been subjected to such harsh legal penalties or such 
heavy-handed treatment by law enforcement. the applicable russian legislation in 
effect at the time of the violation established the sanction of a fine in the amount of 
1,000 rubles in the a case of presenting “offense to the religious feelings of believers 
and/or desecration of items, signs and emblems of religious reverence” (Part 2 of 
Art. 5.26 of the russian Code of Administrative offenses). this exactly fits the violation 
committed by Pussy riot in Moscow’s Christ the savior Cathedral, and it has little 
overlap with “hooliganism,” the violation for which the participants were sentenced. 
In other words, the “punk prayer” was an administrative offense, that is, an unlawful, 
guilty act that is characterized by a considerably lower degree of public danger than 
a crime. If their actions had been assessed objectively rather than according to the 
“best traditions” of the soviet law, Pussy riot members would have been fined and 
that would have been the end of the case.
In this particular case, nevertheless, who did it and how it was done was more 
important than what was done, and the russian judicial machine reacted in strict 
accordance to Art. 24 of the infamous 1922 soviet Criminal Code, which stipulates 
that “when determining the punitive measure, the degree and the character of 
the threat the offender poses as well as the degree and the danger of the crime he 
committed are examined. In pursuing these aims the circumstances of the crime 
are examined, the identity of the criminal is established because it manifested itself 
in the crime the offender committed and in his motives, and because it can be 
established based on his way of living and his past. Also, the extent to which the 
crime itself violates the principles of public safety at a given time and under the given 
circumstances is determined.” this accurately describes the illegal, one-sided and 
biased approach to evidence by Judge Marina syrova, who stated that the behavior 
of the accused in the courtroom should be considered as yet another proof of their 
guilt – an interpretation that ensured the required result: the members of Pussy riot 
were not found guilty of what they actually did, but, according to the best traditions 
of early soviet criminal justice, were sentenced on the basis of their categorization 
as socially dangerous individuals. It is notable that acts insulting religious feelings 
were criminalized in June of 2013.28
The “Rubber Homes” Legislation. december of 2013 saw changes to russia’s 
law “on the rights of Citizens of the russian Federation to Freedom of Movement, 
28  Criminal Code of the russian Federation of 1996, supra note 25, Art. 148.
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Choice of Place of sojourn and residence within the russian Federation.” At the 
same time, the Criminal Code introduced criminal liability for fictitious registration 
of russian and foreign citizens or stateless people (Art. 322-2), as well as for fictitious 
registration of foreign citizens or stateless people at a location in the russian 
Federation (Art. 322-3). the legislative intent for this law was stated with appealing 
frankness in the explanatory note to the bill: “hundreds of thousands of people 
register each year in thousands of so-called ‘rubber homes’ in russia with no intention 
of living at the locations. At the same time, their real place of residence is not known. 
In 2011 alone, nearly 300,000 people were registered at only 6,400 addresses. 
By exercising their right to choose the place of residence, many citizens are shirking 
their constitutional duties to other citizens, the state and society.” the note adds: “this 
situation became possible due to massive abuse by homeowners of their property 
rights, often for material motives.”
this law is dangerous not only on its own terms but because it is aimed at 
abolishing the supremacy of a person’s rights and freedoms – and accentuating his 
or her responsibilities. here, the bill’s authors trample the Constitution, in particular, 
its Art. 2, which states that: “the person, his rights and freedoms shall be the supreme 
value. the recognition, observance and protection of human and civil rights and 
freedoms shall be an obligation of the state.” In part, the Constitution focuses on 
a person’s rights and freedoms, and not his duties, because rights and freedoms must 
be considered foremost in a properly functioning legal system, both based on legal 
history and due to the significance of rights and freedoms in society. Constitutional 
obligations for individuals are younger than constitutional rights by almost two 
centuries, and only began acquiring a legal expression after the second world war. 
the textbook list of traditional obligations implicitly or openly placed by the state 
on its citizens usually consists of compliance with laws and other statutory acts, the 
obligation to pay taxes and the duty to serve in the military. In modern constitutions, 
one can see not only the term “citizens’ obligations” itself, but even whole chapters 
and sections dedicated to this subject (for example, Part I of the Italian Constitution 
on “rights and duties of Citizens;” title III of the venezuelan Constitution on “duties, 
human rights and guarantees;” title III of the Constitution of Panama on “Individual 
and social rights and duties;” Part I, Chapter 2, division 2 of the spanish Constitution 
on “rights and duties of Citizens.”). the russian Constitution, by contrast, contains no 
such developed theory of duties, which means the reference to any such principles 
in justifying legislation is deeply disconcerting.
Second Citizenship Legislation. In June of 2014, changes to the russian 
legislation introduced the obligation of russian citizens who have a second nationality 
or a residence permit in a different country to notify in writing the federal Migration 
service. these changes included amendments to russia’s law on Citizenship, the 
Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Code, which was amended with Art. 330.2: 
“Failure to Comply with the obligation to Notify of the Citizenship (Nationality) of 
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a Foreign state or a residence Permit or other document Confirming the right to 
Live Permanently in a Foreign state.” such a violation was made punishable by a fine 
of up to 200,000 rubles or up to an amount equal to the offender’s annual income, 
or by compulsory labor for a term of up to 400 hours. Apparently, the drafters of 
these amendments neglected to acquaint themselves with the criminal law. If they 
had, they would have known that the criminalization of acts is based on a number 
of qualifying characteristics, such as culpability, punishability, and public danger 
(Art. 14 of the Criminal Code). Part 2 of this Article expressively provides that “an 
action [inaction] is not considered a crime, although it can formally contain any 
characteristics of an offense under this Code, but because [such an action] does not 
represent any public danger due to its insignificance.” Public danger is one criterion 
used in defining a crime that constitutes a socially dangerous act that harms or 
threatens to harm the individual, society, or the state. the social danger that results 
from a russian citizen’s failure to inform the relevant authorities about his or her 
possession of another state’s citizenship or residence permit was never made clear 
in the legislation or otherwise. 
the problem of dual citizenship and the desire to criminalize it has preoccupied 
domestic legislators for some time. Back in 2000, Alexei Mitrofanov, a member of 
the Parliament of the russian Federation, prepared and submitted draft law to the 
state duma, in which he proposed criminalizing the acquisition of another state’s 
citizenship by a russian Federation citizen. shortly thereafter, he proposed adding 
the following language to Art. 136 of the Criminal Code: “Acquisition by a person 
of the nationality of another state while temporarily staying or residing outside 
the russian Federation, while retaining the citizenship of the russian Federation, 
shall be illegal.” upon closer examination, this language is not much different from 
some of the provisions of the notorious Art. 64 of the 1960 Criminal Code of the 
russian soviet Federative socialist republic (upheld by the Constitutional Court of 
the russian Federation on december 20, 1995), which labeled the refusal to return 
from abroad or the act of fleeing abroad as treason. It is noteworthy that the third 
state duma considered this bill in the first reading in october of 2002 and responded 
sensibly. the Law Committee said that the bill contradicted the provisions of Art. 6 
of the Constitution, noting that it is difficult to define the acquisition of another 
country’s citizenship as a socially dangerous act. the Legal department of the state 
duma decided that “the proposed project establishing criminal liability for actions 
aimed at a russian citizen’s acquisition of the citizenship of another state raises 
serious objections” and was unacceptable.
Currently para. 3.1 of Art. 4 of the Federal law “on Basic guarantees of Electoral 
rights and the russian Federation Citizens’ right to Participate in referenda” 
(Nо. 67-FZ of June 12, 2002) reads: “Citizens of the russian Federation with foreign 
nationality or a residence permit or other document confirming the right of residence 
of a citizen of the russian Federation on the territory of a foreign state do not have the 
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right to be elected. these citizens have the right to be elected into local government, 
if it is stipulated by an international treaty of the russian Federation.” this Article’s 
provision, which denies individuals holding another country’s passport one of the 
most important political rights held by russian citizens, is not in accord with Parts 2 
and 3 of Art. 55 of the russian Constitution, which reads:
•	 Laws	that	abrogate	or	derogate	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	men	and	
citizens shall not be passed in the russian Federation.
•	 The	rights	and	freedoms	of	persons	and	citizens	may	be	limited	by	
federal law only to the extent that it is necessary for the protection of the 
constitutional order, morality, health, and the rights and lawful interests of 
other persons, national defense, and state security.
Provisions of the aforementioned law also disagree with Part 4 of Art. 15 of the 
Constitution of the russian Federation, which states that the “generally recognized 
principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the russian 
Federation form a constitutive part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the 
russian Federation stipulates other rules than those provided by law, the rules of the 
international treaty are to be applied.” In addition, these provisions contradict Art. 3 
of Protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and Art. 4 of the Convention itself.
The Case of Svetlana Davydova. In November 2012, substantial amendments 
were made to Art. 275 of the Criminal Code relating to espionage and state secrets. In 
order to understand the significance of this disastrous change, it is sufficient to compare 
the text of the previous version of this article with its current version. Legal sanctions 
for the crime have remained unchanged, but the scope of the Article has changed 
dramatically. Prior to November 2012, Art. 275 defined high treason as “espionage, 
transfer of a state secret or any provision of assistance to a foreign government, foreign 
organization or their representatives in their conduct of hostile actions to the detriment 
of the external security of the Russian Federation, committed by a citizen of the Russian 
Federation.” As amended, however, Art. 275 defines high treason as an act “that is 
committed by a citizen of the Russian Federation, acts of espionage, disclosure to a foreign 
state, an international or foreign organization, or their representatives of information 
constituting a state secret that has been entrusted or has become known to that person 
through service, work, study or in other cases determined by the legislation of the Russian 
Federation, or any financial, material and technical, consultative or other assistance 
to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization, or their representatives in 
activities against the security of the Russian Federation.”
the following are the most dangerous pitfalls of the new provision:
1. the phrase “hostile actions to the detriment of the external security of the 
russian Federation” is replaced by the ambiguous phrase “activities against the 
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security of the russian Federation.” the omission of the word “hostile” makes this 
concept indecipherably ambiguous.
2. the new definition covers not only external but also internal security. A clear 
and detailed definition of either concept is absent from the Criminal Code.
3. the ambiguity of the wording “financial, material and technical, consultative or 
other assistance to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization, or their 
representatives in activities against the security of the russian Federation” makes 
the article applicable to virtually any activity.
4. International organizations are identified as potential recipients of information 
constituting state secrets, as well as of the abovementioned types of assistance. 
Any list of such recipients must necessarily be open-ended and can include any 
international organization by default.
5. the vagueness of this statutory provision makes it impossible for citizens to 
properly abide by it, a violation of one of the fundamental conditions of the rule 
of law.
6. the provision’s extensive ambiguity creates unlimited possibilities for arbitrary 
interpretation and selective application. Pursuant to the provisions of Art. 275, 
a criminal case for high treason can be initiated against any citizen of the russian 
Federation who provides someone almost any information or commits almost any 
action.
In January 2015, svetlana davydova encountered these pitfalls personally. she 
was subjected to the most radical measure prescribed by the law: being remanded 
in custody. According to Art. 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person is taken 
into custody “when it is impossible to apply a different, less stringent preventive 
measure. when a person is remanded in custody, a judge’s ruling must detail the 
specific factual circumstances based on which the judge made such a decision.” 
what were the factual circumstances based on which the judge decided that the 
use of less stringent preventive measures against the mother of seven children was 
not possible? According to the text of the ruling of February 3, 2015, the decision by 
Investigator Mikhail svinolup to take davydova into custody was based on Art. 110 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to this Article, “a preventive measure 
is changed to a less stringent one once the basis for imposing such a measure has 
changed.”
It is abundantly clear that what really changed was not the basis for the preventive 
measure, but the team of lawyers: on February 2, 2015, davydova dismissed her 
attorney, Andrei stebenev, and since that day she has been represented by attorneys 
sergei Badamshin and Igor Pavlov. the results of this shift became evident the day 
after the dismissal, when, at the request of Badamshin and Pavlov, davydova was 
released from custody on bail. the Moscow Bar Association thereafter initiated 
disciplinary proceedings for inadequate provision of legal assistance against 
stebenev, who was eventually disbarred.
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davydova’s case confirms that the defensive nature of the soviet criminal law, 
enshrined in the very first soviet Criminal Codes of 1922 and 1926, has returned. 
under this Code, the state actively defends itself against its citizens and sometimes 
exceeds the limits of self-defense to commit acts of oppression against them.
The Case of Ildar Dadin. Further proof to that russian criminal law is on 
a dangerous track of restoration of certain attitudes of Bolshevist law can be found 
in the case of Ildar dadin, an opposition and civic activist. In the summer of 2014, 
a new article, Art. 212.1 on “repeated violations of the Established rules of organizing 
or holding Public gatherings, Meetings, rallies, Marches, and Pickets,” was added to 
the russian Criminal Code. In december 2015, Ildar dadin became the first person 
prosecuted and convicted under this Article, which has been strongly criticized both 
by members of the russian Presidential human rights Council and by most prominent 
russian lawyers as contradictory to the country’s fundamental law and the European 
Convention on human rights. Noted russian lawyer henri reznik has pointed out the 
anti-constitutional nature of this Article and emphasized that multiple and repetitive 
administrative offenses do not constitute a crime, as criminal acts are associated with 
a higher level of danger to the public.29 reznik also noted another blatant violation: 
when a criminal case against Ildar danin was initiated, some court decisions on dadin’s 
administrative offenses had not yet come into legal force and therefore charges under 
Art. 212.1 of the russian Criminal Code were filed against him illegally.
there are several shocking features in Ildar dadin’s case. 
First, Art. 212.1 itself and dadin’s criminal case initiated under this article will 
eventually become textbook examples of the restoration of Bolshevik-style criminal 
law in post-soviet russia. those who suggested introducing criminal liability for 
repeated violations of the rules of organizing and holding meetings, rallies, and 
other forms of public gatherings cannot draw justification from the danger such 
assemblies pose to the public, because there is simply no such danger. once again 
following the “best traditions” of Art. 5 of the 1922 Criminal Code of the rsFsr, the 
authors of this legislative innovation nonetheless found that such gatherings posed 
a threat to the current political system. Art. 212.1 stipulates a maximum penalty of 
five years, which qualifies such offenses as medium-gravity crimes.30 For comparison, 
the same maximum penalty is provided for the murder of two or more people 
committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance (Part 2 of Art. 107 
of the Criminal Code) and for incitement to suicide (Art. 110 of the Criminal Code). 
For further comparison, Part 1 of Art. 117 stipulates a maximum penalty of three 
years for torture without aggravation, thus making it a minor crime. In other words, 
29  Букварева А. Генри Резник – о приговоре Ильдару Дадину: “Это оскорбление права,” Новая 
газета, 1 апреля 2016 г. [Aleksandra Bukvareva, Henri Reznik on Ildar Dadin’s Conviction: It’s an Insult of 
Law, Novaya gazeta, April 1, 2016) (Feb. 20, 2017), available at https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/ 
2016/04/01/68036-genri-reznik-8212-o-prigovore-ildaru-dadinu-171-eto-oskorblenie-prava-187.
30  Criminal Code of the russian Federation of 1996, supra note 25, Art. 15.
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from the point of view of 21st-century russian legislators, torture is less dangerous 
for society than repeated violations of the rules of holding meetings, marches, and 
rallies, including individual pickets. this represents yet another similarity between 
this article and early statutes of soviet criminal legislation, according to which crimes 
against the state – which, in this case, has been equated with the current political 
order – posed a bigger public threat than crimes against persons. 
Second, as in the Pussy riot case, law-enforcement bodies were more interested 
in Ildar dadin himself as a “socially dangerous element” than they were in his 
actions. the situation evolved along the lines of the first soviet Criminal Code, which 
instructed judges, when deciding on a sentence, to take into account the level and 
nature of the threat posed by both the criminal and his act and to “establish the 
personality of the criminal, since it revealed itself in the crime he committed as well 
as in his motives, and since it can be established based on his way of life and past.”31 
Judicial authorities determined the punishment according to their “socialist legal 
conscience”: although the prosecutor was asking for only two years of imprisonment, 
the judge decided such a punishment would be insufficient. As a result, dadin was 
sentenced to three years in a penal colony.
Third, although Art. 51 of the russian Constitution guarantees the right not to 
give incriminating evidence against one’s relatives, Ildar dadin’s father testified 
against his own son. Even Art. 205.6, which joined the russian Criminal Code in July 
of 2015, contains an annotation stipulating that a person cannot be held criminally 
liable for failure to report a crime prepared or committed by his or her spouse or 
close relative, and in 2015 this Article did not even exist. It seems that some sort of 
social genetic memory dating back to stalin’s 1930s, when legislative innovations 
encouraged whistleblowing and denunciations, must have kicked in. 
Fourth, the punishment stipulated by Art. 212.1 openly violates the principle of 
proportionality, which is one of the fundamental principles of criminal law. According 
to Art. 43, punishment is used to restore social justice as well as to correct convicted 
criminals and to prevent crimes in the future. Actions criminalized by Art. 212.1 of the 
Criminal Code do not infringe upon social justice. From the point of view of criminal 
law, being an accumulation of administrative offenses, such actions do not represent 
any social danger, and thus, they do not entail the task of correcting the convicted 
individual. the introduction of this Article to the Criminal Code was motivated solely 
by political expediency and the urge to fight dissent. As for punishment, just like in 
feudal times, it serves as intimidation to teach others not to dissent.
on February 10, 2017, the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation 
delivered its decision on constitutionality of Art. 212.1. the Court ruled that the 
Article was constitutional in the interpretation given by the Constitutional Court. By 
the virtue of the 2016 amendments to the 1994 Federal Constitutional law “on the 
31  Criminal Code of the rsFsr of 1922, supra note 4, Art. 24.
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Constitutional Court of the russian Federation,” “the constitutional legal meaning of 
provisions of Article 212.1 of the Criminal Code of the russian Federation discovered 
in this decision shall be binding for all representative, executive and judicial bodies of 
state power, bodies of local self-government, enterprises, institutions, organizations, 
officials, citizens and their associations.”32 the Court ruled that the federal legislature 
is eligible (but not obliged) to change Art. 212.1 “following the requirements of the 
Constitution of the russian Federation and in accordance with the legal stances 
of the Constitutional Court outlined in this decision.”33 on February 22, 2017, the 
Presidium of the supreme Court of the russian Federation repealed the dadin’s 
conviction on narrow grounds, and on February 26, dadin was released from the 
penal colony. while dadin’s release is a certainly a very good development, Art. 212.1 
remains in the Criminal Code of the russian Federation and will be further applied 
by law-enforcers. 
As with Art. 275 on espionage, the ambiguity of Art. 212.1 makes vitally impor-
tant the issue of who will apply the law. the mentalities of judges, prosecutors, 
investigators and other actors in the process play critical roles in the real-world 
context of the courtrooms where life intersects with the law on a daily basis. today, 
russian legal system is operated by conventional law-enforcement bureaucrats 
whose minds bear the deformities of soviet-style legal consciousness. 
Beyond immediate questions of justice and constitutionality, these laws raise 
an even more worrisome question: why is the assumption of the infallibility of 
the state, most recently evident during soviet times, so firmly entrenched in the 
minds of russian legislators and government officials? the soviet instincts of these 
individuals are still sharp, but their historical memory is short. It seems clear that 
they either do not remember or do not want to remember what an authoritarian 
regime often does to its most loyal vassals. here is just one of the glorious pages 
of russian history which might provide an appropriately bracing warning. In June 
1937, a special military judicial panel of the ussr supreme Court returned a guilty 
verdict in a case of an “anti-soviet trotskyite military organization” and sentenced to 
death several elite commanders of the soviet Army, including Mikhail tukhachevsky, 
Ieronim uborevich, and Iona yakir. the special military judicial panel consisted of 
nine members, of whom four were subsequently executed in 1938, one was tortured 
to death, and another one, according to some reports, shot himself in anticipation 
of his arrest. solely on the basis of individual survival, these statistics should be 
harrowing for government officials: a criminal justice system unaware of its because 
history tends to repeat itself.
32  Постановление Конституционного Суда РФ от 10 февраля 2017 г. № 2-П [decision of the 
Constitutional Court of the russian Federation Nо. 2-P of February 10, 2017] (Feb. 20, 2017), available 
at https://rg.ru/2017/02/28/sud-dok.html.
33  Id.
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